CVE-2026-80772: Linux

EPSS: 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Affected products

• Linux Linux: from 5.16, before 6.1.185 (fixed in 6.1.185); from 6.2, before 6.6.154 (fixed in 6.6.154); from 6.7, before 6.12.106 (fixed in 6.12.106); from 6.13, before 6.18.47 (fixed in 6.18.47); from 6.19, before 7.1.11 (fixed in 7.1.11); from 7.2, before 7.2.1 (fixed in 7.2.1)

Published 2026-09-04. Last modified 2026-09-04.