CVE-2026-74556: Linux
Critical severity, CVSS 9.8. EPSS: 0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP, REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer. The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer. Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.
Affected products
- Linux Linux: from 2.6.29, before 5.10.265 (fixed in 5.10.265); from 5.11, before 5.15.216 (fixed in 5.15.216); from 5.16, before 6.1.183 (fixed in 6.1.183); from 6.2, before 6.6.151 (fixed in 6.6.151); from 6.7, before 6.12.103 (fixed in 6.12.103); from 6.13, before 6.18.44 (fixed in 6.18.44); …
Published 2026-08-15. Last modified 2026-08-19.