CVE-2026-46123: Linux Kernel

High severity, CVSS 7.7. EPSS: 0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one(). Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device. The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory. Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device. Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle(). Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log. Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.

Affected products

• Linux Linux Kernel: from 5.15.78, before 5.15.209 (fixed in 5.15.209); from 6.0.8, before 6.1 (fixed in 6.1); from 6.1.1, before 6.1.175 (fixed in 6.1.175); from 6.2, before 6.6.140 (fixed in 6.6.140); from 6.7, before 6.12.88 (fixed in 6.12.88); from 6.13, before 6.18.30 (fixed in 6.18.30); …

Published 2026-05-28. Last modified 2026-06-24.