CVE-2026-46064: Linux Kernel

High severity, CVSS 7.1. EPSS: 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.

Affected products

• Linux Linux Kernel: from 2.6.12.1, before 5.10.258 (fixed in 5.10.258); from 5.11, before 5.15.209 (fixed in 5.15.209); from 5.16, before 6.1.175 (fixed in 6.1.175); from 6.2, before 6.6.140 (fixed in 6.6.140); from 6.7, before 6.12.86 (fixed in 6.12.86); from 6.13, before 6.18.27 (fixed in 6.18.27); …

Published 2026-05-27. Last modified 2026-06-24.