CVE-2026-43038: Linux Kernel

Critical severity, CVSS 9.8. EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.

Affected products

• Linux Linux Kernel: after 3.13, before 5.10.253 (fixed in 5.10.253); from 5.11, before 5.15.203 (fixed in 5.15.203); from 5.16, before 6.1.168 (fixed in 6.1.168); from 6.2, before 6.6.134 (fixed in 6.6.134); from 6.7, before 6.12.81 (fixed in 6.12.81); from 6.13, before 6.18.22 (fixed in 6.18.22); …

Published 2026-05-01. Last modified 2026-08-20.